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abstract: the value of debt tax shields in foundational corporate valuation models by nobel 
laureates modigliani and miller (mm) continues to be a controversial issue that is central to our 
understanding of corporate finance. Rather than discounting debt interest payments using a risk-
less interest rate or unlevered equity rate, the present paper proposes the use of the levered cost of 
equity. assuming no bankruptcy risk and no personal taxes, our revised tax model yields an inverted 
U-shaped firm value function with an interior optimal capital structure. analyses are extended to 
Miller’s personal tax extension of MM’s tax model. Also, implications to corporate capital structure 
decisions and previous literature are discussed. 
Keywords: value of tax shields; Capital structure; Firm valuation; share valuation 
Corporate valuation theories by nobel laureates modigliani and miller 
(hereafter mm) (1958, 1963) have become cornerstones of modern thinking 
about capital structure. Relevant to real world practice, their debt tax gain 
arguments would tend to favor the use of financial leverage by firms and 
individuals in capital markets. in view of recent leverage excesses that con-
tributed to the financial and economic crises of 2008 and 2009, after more 
than 50 years of debate and extensive empirical evidence,2 it would seem 
worthwhile to revisit the long-standing controversy surrounding MM’s tax 
valuation model. the main dispute focuses on how to compute the present 
value of interest tax deductions on debt. initiating the debate, in their ori-
ginal tax model in 1958, mm used the unlevered equity rate to discount 
interest tax deductions and proposed relatively modest tax gains on debt 
1 We have benefited from numerous discussions over the years with many colleagues, includ-
ing Ali, Anari, Will Armstrong, Jaap Bos, Michele Caputo, Paige Fields, Donald Fraser, Johan 
Knif, Michael Koetter, Seppo Pynnönen, Joseph Reising, Hwan Shin, Soenke Sievers, Sorin 
Sorescu, Antti Suvanto, Joseph Tham, and Marilyn Wiley, in addition to participants at the 
2008 Financial management association european conference in Prague, Czech Republic, 
2010 midwest Finance Conference in las vegas, nevada, and 2010 international Finance 
Conference in mexico City, mexico. all remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.
2 For example, see myers (1974), deangelo and masulis (1980), masulis (1980), Fama 
and French (1998), Ruback, (1995, 2002), Graham (2000, 2008), Graham and Harvey 
(2001), Brealey and myers (2003), arzac and Glosten (2005), and many others. Graham 
(2003) provides an excellent review of this literature.
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impUesto a la renta corporatiVa y el costo de capital: 
Una reVisión
resUmen: el valor del ahorro de impuestos de la deuda en los modelos 
fundamentales de valoración de empresas de los Premios nobel modi-
gliani y miller (mm) continúa siendo un tema controversial que es funda-
mental para nuestra comprensión de las finanzas corporativas. en lugar de 
descontar los pagos de intereses de la deuda con una tasa de interés libre 
de riesgo o la tasa del patrimonio sin apalancamiento, el presente trabajo 
propone el uso del costo del patrimonio con deuda. suponiendo que no 
hay riesgos de quiebra y no hay impuestos personales de renta, nuestro 
modelo de impuestos una vez revisado obtiene una función del valor de 
la firma en forma de U invertida con una estructura óptima de capital 
interior. los análisis se extienden a la extensión miller con impuestos per-
sonales para el modelo con impuestos de mm. además, se discuten la lit-
eratura existente y las implicaciones para las decisiones empresariales de 
estructura de capital.
palabras claVe: valor del ahorro de impuestos, estructura de capital, 
valoración de empresas, la valoración de acciones. 
impôt de rente corporatiVe et coût de capital: Une rÉVision
rÉsUmÉ : La valeur de l’épargne d’impôts de la dette dans les modèles fon-
damentaux d’évaluation des entreprises des prix Nobel Modigliani et Miller 
(MM) continue à être un thème controversé qui est fondamental pour notre 
compréhension des finances corporatives. au lieu de décompter les paie-
ments d’intérêts de la dette avec un taux d’intérêt libre de risque ou le taux 
de patrimoine sans effet levier, ce travail propose l’utilisation du coût du 
patrimoine avec la dette. Supposant l’inexistence de risques de faillite et 
d’impôts personnels de rente, notre modèle d’impôts obtient, après révi-
sion, une fonction de la valeur de la firme en forme de U inverti avec une 
structure optimum de capital intérieur. Les analyses s’étendent à l’exten-
sion Miller avec des impôts personnels pour le modèle avec impôts de MM. 
la littérature existante est également discutée ainsi que les implications 
pour les décisions entrepreneuriales de structure de capital.
mots-cleFs: Valeur de l’épargne d’impôts, Structure de capital, Évalua-
tion d’entreprises, Évaluation d’actions
corporação de imposto de renda e o cUsto do capital: Uma 
reVisão.
resUmo: o valor da economia de impostos da dívida nos modelos funda-
mentais de valoração de empresas dos Prêmios nobel modigliani y miller 
(mm) continua sendo um tema controvertido e fundamental para nossa 
compreensão das finanças corporativas. em vez de descontar os paga-
mentos de juros da dívida com uma taxa de juro livre de risco ou com a 
taxa do patrimônio sem influência , o presente trabalho propõe o uso do 
custo do patrimônio com dívida. supondo que não há riscos de quebra e 
não há impostos pessoais de renda, nosso modelo de impostos depois de 
revisado obtém uma função do valor da firma em forma de U invertida 
com uma ótima estrutura de capital interior. As análises se estendem à 
extensão miller com impostos pessoais para o modelo com impostos de 
mm. além disso, discutem-se a literatura existente e as implicações para 
as decisões empresariais de estrutura de capital.
palaVras-cHaVe: valor da economia de impostos, estrutura de capital, 
valoração de empresas, valoração de ações.
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interest; however, in 1963 mm overturned their earlier 
original tax model and proposed a tax correction model 
that discounted interest tax deductions at the riskless debt 
rate to yield very large debt tax gains. 
motivated by excessively large debt tax shields that did not 
coincide with observed corporate practice, miller (1977) 
extended MM’s tax correction valuation model to personal 
taxes and proposed that interest tax gains on debt have 
little or no value for most firms. excluding personal taxes, 
some authors subsequently returned to MM’s original tax 
model approach by discounting interest tax deductions at 
the unlevered equity discount rate, including Harris and 
Pringle (1985), Modigliani (1988), and Kaplan and Ruback 
(1995). also, miles and ezzell (1980, 1985) and arzac and 
Glosten (2005) proposed to discount tax shields at the risk-
less rate in the first period but at the unlevered equity rate 
thereafter. Consistent with these studies, Grinblatt and liu 
(2008) viewed the debt tax shield as a derivative of the un-
derlying unlevered asset (and its cash flows) and used op-
tion pricing methods to derive its value. other researchers 
have employed the cost of risky debt to discount interest 
tax deductions, such as myers (1974), luehrman (1997), 
damodaran (2006), and others, which assumes that the 
only risk associated with interest tax deductions (i.e., tax 
shields) is the risk of debt. Given risky debt in which earn-
ings before interest and taxes may possibly be less than 
interest, Wrightsman (1978) argued that the tax shield 
would be reduced compared to using the riskless rate be-
cause the effective tax shield from debt will depend on op-
erating earnings. in general, these alternative discounting 
approaches3 tend to diminish the present value of tax 
gains on debt and thereby soften MM’s 1963 conclusions. 
More recently, Ross (2005) has commented that MM’s 
static tax correction model is flawed. in his words, “a flaw 
in the traditional approach occurs […] by valuing the cash 
flow of the tax shield at the riskless debt rate. […] as miller 
(1977) argues, the tax shield goes to the equity holders 
and not the bondholders and the discount rate at which it 
should be valued should depend on the marginal tax rate 
of equity holders and not debt holders.” (2005, p. 7) since 
3 For studies debating different discount rates, see miles and ezell 
(1980, 1985), Harris and Pringle (1985), modigliani (1988), damo-
daran (1994), Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Ruback (2002), Fernan-
dez (2004, 2007), arzac and Glosten (2005), Cooper and nyborg 
(2006), and others. For example, miles and ezell (1985) have ar-
gued that, if firms maintain a constant level of debt as assumed by 
mm, the riskless cost of debt is the appropriate discount rate for the 
debt tax shield. However, if firms instead maintain a constant debt-
to-firm value ratio, debt tax shields should be discounted using the 
unlevered equity rate.
debt tax gains are passed to shareholders as dividends,4 
he applied the personal equity tax rate to the tax shield. 
defining after-tax equity value with interest tax deduc-
tions as the sum of the after-tax equity value with no 
interest deductions plus the tax gain from interest deduc-
tions, which is consistent with MM’s tax models (i.e., all 
tax gains are paid out to shareholders), it is shown that 
the after-tax value of equity with no interest deductions 
becomes negative when debt values exceed the unlevered 
value of the firm. due to limited liability and no bank-
ruptcy risk, equity value with or without interest deduc-
tions cannot be negative. this unreasonable result occurs 
even with no bankruptcy risk when discounting interest 
tax shields using both risky debt rates and unlevered eq-
uity rates in their tax models.5 to overcome this problem, 
a revised tax model is proposed which that discounts in-
terest deductions using the levered cost of equity. this ap-
proach provides a robust tax valuation paradigm within 
MM’s framework that gives positive equity values with 
and without debt tax gains. To the authors’ knowledge, no 
previous papers have investigated this logically appealing 
levered equity rate discounting approach within the mm 
tax model framework. Upon doing so, the valuation results 
help mitigate a number of criticisms of MM’s tax models, 
contribute to reconciling theory and evidence on capital 
structure and firm valuation, and provide new insights into 
the role of debt tax shields in firm valuation. 
Section 1 briefly overviews MM’s original and tax correc-
tion valuation models. section 2 applies a portfolio ap-
proach to compare equity valuation results using different 
discount rates to find the present values of interest deduc-
tions. section 3 provides numerical examples that show 
the proposed revised tax model using the cost of equity 
to discount interest deductions overcomes negative equity 
and related negative cost of equity problems. Following 
miller (1977), section 4 extends the analyses to personal 
taxes, which shows that, unlike MM’s tax correction model, 
the revised tax model is little changed and therefore ro-
bust to personal taxes. section 5 discusses implications to 
corporate capital structure decisions and related literature 
that bode well for the revised tax model’s valuation of debt 
tax shields. section 6 concludes.
4 standard textbooks in finance commonly note that interest tax 
deductions increase the cash flows of shareholders. For example, 
Grinblatt and titman (1998, p. 511) observe that, if a firm issues 
debt to buy back equity, remaining shareholders benefit from an 
increase in cash flow associated with interest tax deductions on 
debt.
5 simple numerical examples are available from the authors upon 
request.
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overview of the mm no-tax 
and valuation models 
According to Proposition I of Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) 
(1958) original valuation model without corporate taxes 
(but no personal taxes), firm valuation is independent of 
capital structure. However, taxes result in a tax gain on 
debt interest deductions. in mm (1958) the unlevered eq-
uity rate is used to discount debt interest deductions but 
in mm (1963) the much lower riskless debt rate is used for 
discounting purposes, which resulted in a large tax gain on 
debt usage to the firm and its shareholders. in the absence 
of bankruptcy risk, Proposition i was soundly rejected in 
favor of an extreme all-debt capital structure corner solu-
tion. in a 1988 rejoinder to the mm tax correction paper, 
Miller (1988) commented that: “We must admit that we 
too were somewhat taken aback when we first saw this 
conclusion (i.e., an all-debt capital structure) emerging 
from our analysis.” (1988, p. 112)6 as noted by Green and 
Hollifield (2003), because an all-debt corner solution is at 
odds with observed capital structures of firms, MM’s tax 
model is not useful for policy purposes. 
6 See also Gordon (1989) and Weston (1989). 
in an effort to assuage large tax gains on debt, researchers 
introduced bankruptcy costs to trade-off tax benefits of 
debt against rising costs of debt as firms increase financial 
leverage (see Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), 
Chen and Kim (1979), Bradley and Kim (1984), Myers 
(1984), shyam-sunder and myers (1998), and others). How-
ever, empirical evidence has revealed that these costs are 
relatively small (see Warner (1977), Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998), Frank and Goyal (2008), and others). Referring to 
the lopsided trade-off of excessively large tax gains on in-
terest deductions compared to small expected bankruptcy 
costs, especially for big firms with high credit quality, miller 
(1977) criticized MM’s tax correction model by using the 
humorous metaphor of a “horse and rabbit stew” to de-
scribe their relative magnitudes. motivated in large part by 
this problem, Miller extended MM’s tax correction model 
to personal taxes. assuming negligible personal taxes on 
equity (due to deferring capital gains) and personal taxes 
on interest income equal to the corporate tax rate at the 
margin in the bond market, he found that there is no tax 
gain from financial leverage for the corporate sector as a 
whole (i.e., Proposition i holds). 
it is interesting that modigliani (1988) later made a re-
versal: “Personal taxation aside, the definitive truth was all 
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in mm (1958) ...” (1988, p. 153) as in the original valua-
tion model with corporate taxes, “... the levered firm can be 
seen to be proportional to that of the unlevered firm ... this 
proportionality of returns in turn implies that the market 
value of the levered firm VL must also be proportional to 
that of the unlevered firm, VU ...” (1988, p. 152) the reason 
for this reversal is that modigliani returned to using a risky 
rate of return to discount interest tax deductions similar to 
the discount rate on the unlevered firm’s equity earnings, 
which are discounted at a riskless rate of interest in MM’s 
tax correction model. the larger discount rate on interest 
tax gains decreases the present value of debt tax shields 
and diminishes their potency as a factor driving corporate 
capital structure decisions. Closely related to Modigliani’s 
retrospective opinion, miles and ezzell (1980, 1985), Harris 
and Pringle (1985), Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Arzac and 
Glosten (2005), Grinblatt and liu (2008), and others have 
argued (in different ways) that debt tax shields are as risky 
as the free (unlevered) cash flows generated from the firm’s 
assets, which suggests that the unlevered equity discount 
rate is appropriate. However, as shown in the next section, 
while application of higher unlevered equity discount rates 
diminishes the magnitude of the value of debt tax shields, 
it does not necessarily overturn the extreme all-debt cap-
ital structure implication of MM’s tax correction model. 
MM’s no-tax and tax models of firm valuation are well 
known. assuming no corporate or personal taxes, no po-
tential bankruptcy and nondebt tax shields, capital mar-
kets are frictionless, symmetric information, complete 
contracting, complete markets, and all cash flow streams 
are perpetuities, mm derived the following original model 
of corporate valuation with no taxes:7
UL
 (X rD)  rD  XV = S + D = V ,
ri
+ ==  (1)
where VL= the market value of the levered firm, S = the 
market value of levered equity, D = the market value of 
riskless debt, X = the expected value of risky stream X that 
is divided between the firm’s shareholders and debtholders 
as (X–rD) and rD, respectively, r = the riskless debt rate, 
ρ = the expected market rate of capitalization with no taxes 
(i.e., required rate of return or cost of unlevered equity), 
i = the expected levered cost of equity with no taxes, and 
VU = the market value of the unlevered (or no debt) firm. 
Known as Proposition I, this no-tax model implies that the 
value of the firm is independent of its financial leverage 
and that unlevered and levered weighted average costs of 
capital (WACC) are equal to one another. Using equation 
7 Stiglitz (1969) has shown that MM’s original valuation model with 
no taxes holds under more general conditions, in such a way that 
these assumptions are not restrictive for the most part.
(1), the value of equity can be computed alternatively as 
S = VL– D = VU– D. that is, given the value of unlevered 
equity, or vU, we can substitute in values of debt, or D, 
within the range of 0 ≤ D ≤ VU to obtain the full range of 
equity values, or S.
With corporate taxes MM (1958, p. 272) originally posited 
that firm value is proportional to the expected after-tax 
earnings of the firm, or Xt, as follows: 
, rD + V = rD + )-(1X = X = V UL   (2)
where LV  = the market value of the levered firm after 
taxes, t = the corporate tax rate, X(1–t) = the expected 
unlevered returns after taxes, ρt= the appropriate after-tax 
market capitalization rate for unlevered equity, rD = the in-
terest payments on riskless debt D paying the riskless debt 
rate r,
 
and 
UV  = the after-tax value of the unlevered firm. 
as already mentioned, modigliani (1988) later noted that, 
since the unlevered equity rate ρt applied to discounting 
interest tax deductions trD is higher than the riskless debt 
rate r, the present value of the debt tax shield is substan-
tially reduced. 
in a major correction to their 1958 paper, mm (1963, p. 
436) altered their original tax model by using the much 
lower riskless rate r to discount interest deductions. dis-
counting the expected after-tax earnings stream defined 
as Xt = (X – rD)(1 – t) + rD = X(1–t) + trD now yielded 
the following firm valuation model: 8
D,  + V = 
r
rD
 +  
) -(1X
 = V UL  (3)
where the tax gain is now D instead of rD/.9 mm created 
arbitrage proofs to show that, in equilibrium, levered firm 
value cannot be more or less than the sum of the unle-
vered firm value plus the tax gain D, such that equation 
(3) holds. the value of the firm is no longer proportional to 
its earnings after taxes, as firm value is dependent on the 
firm’s capital structure. Indeed, excluding bankruptcy costs 
and other imperfections, their interpretation of this tax 
correction model was that the firm’s shareholders will seek 
a corner solution of nearly all debt. the value of levered 
equity is computed simply as St = LV  – D = UV  – D + tD, 
which shows that shareholders reap the large tax gain on 
debt interest. as in the original no tax valuation model, by 
8 it is assumed in this model that debt is constant. as shown later, a 
constant debt policy can be expressed as a constant leverage ratio 
policy also.
9 see myers (1974), miles and ezzell (1980, 1985), Fernandez (2004), 
and Cooper and nyborg (2006) for discussion and different view-
points on computing the present value of tax shields. 
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varying the level of debt within the range 0 ≤ D ≤ LV , the 
full range of equity values, or St, can be computed. 
a comparison of alternative approaches 
to discounting interest deductions
in this section it is comparatively investigated how dif-
ferent discount rates used to find the present value of 
interest deductions affects equity and firm valuation re-
sults. to do this the cash flows paid out to shareholders 
is decomposed into their component parts. a portfolio 
approach is used to show that the equity rate is based 
on a weighted average of the component discount rates 
used to find the present values of the respective cash flow 
components paid to shareholders. According to MM’s tax 
models, the riskiness of each cash flow component deter-
mines its appropriate discount rate. this logic explains the 
usage of the riskless rate in their tax correction model to 
discount interest deductions, which are considered riskless 
assuming the firm maintains a constant level of debt. as 
noted in the previous section, some authors assess the risk-
iness of interest deductions to be similar to free (unlevered) 
cash flows, which occurs upon relaxing the constant debt 
assumption to allow for a constant market value leverage 
ratio. In this case, consistent with MM’s original tax model, 
interest deductions are discounted at the unlevered equity 
rate rt. 
in brief, portfolio analyses reveal that, when debt exceeds 
the unlevered value of the firm, component cash flows 
before interest deductions paid to shareholders imply 
negative equity values before interest deductions and as-
sociated negative equity discount rates. an alternative 
revised tax model is proposed that overcomes these prob-
lems by discounting each cash flow at the required rate of 
return of the particular investor actually receiving the cash 
flow. thus, portfolio analyses imply that interest deduc-
tions paid out to shareholders should be discounted at the 
cost of equity it. 
decomposing equity cash flows in mm’s tax models
since interest deductions are paid out to shareholders, 
focus is made on equity valuation effects of these poten-
tial tax gains. According to MM’s tax correction model, the 
value of equity is:
 (X rD)(1 )S  = .
i
 (4)
this general expression can be decomposed in different 
ways depending on the discount rates chosen for interest 
deductions. For example, MM’s corrected and original tax 
models, respectively, decompose these cash flows using 
r and rt to discount interest deductions, respectively, as 
follows:
MM’s tax correction model: 
 X(1 )  rD rD   S  = ,
r r
+  (5)
MM’s tax original model: 
 X(1 )  rD rD       S  = ,
r
+  (6)
these decompositions can be proven from basic portfolio 
theory. setting equations (4) and (5) equal to one another, 
the discount rate for the portfolio of shareholder cash 
flows (i.e., it) is a weighted average of the discount rates 
(i.e., ρt
 
and r) associated with respective portfolio compo-
nents. as shown in the appendix, the cost of equity can be 
solved to get
D(1 )( r)
S
i = + ,  (7)
which agrees with MM’s formula in their tax correction 
model. similarly, the cost of equity based on equations (4) 
and (6) yields
D( r) ,
S
i = +  (8) 
which confirms MM’s formula in their original tax model.
 
these results validate the portfolio approach as a method-
ology for decomposing shareholder cash flows.
Another way to decompose shareholders’ cash flows is to 
split them into the cash flow after taxes but before interest 
deductions equal to X(1–t) – rD plus interest deductions 
trd. to find the discount rate to apply to the former cash 
flow, suppose that corporate taxes exist but there is no tax 
deductibility of interest and, therefore, no debt tax gain. 
Now shareholders’ total cash flows equal X(1–t) – rD. in 
this realistic case10, it is obvious that MM’s Proposition I in 
their original no-tax valuation model would hold. defining 
NTGV  = the levered value of the firm with taxes but no-tax-
gain (denoted ntG) and NTGS = the levered value of eq-
uity with taxes but no-tax-gain from interest deductions, 
10 According to Warren (1974), interest deductions for U.S. 
corporations in the 1800s and early 1900s were quite limited and 
generally disallowed. in 1918 unlimited interest deductions were 
temporarily allowed by Congress to offset the World War I excess 
profits tax. When this tax was repealed in 1921, interest deductions 
were retained with no explanation given by Congress. Relevant 
to the present discussion, historical precedent exists for the 
plausibility of not allowing firms to deduct interest from earnings. 
more recently, due to budget deficit concerns, some legislative 
proposals in the U.s. Congress call for the elimination of interest 
deductions on home mortgage loans. if such a tax loophole was 
closed for homeowners, it would seem conceivable that corporate 
interest deductions from federal income taxes could be reduced or 
eliminated also. 
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Proposition i implies that NTGV  = NTGS + d = UV .
11 the 
present value of equity cash flows can be defined in this 
case as:
NTG
NTG
 X(1 ) - rDS  = ,
i
 (9)
where NTGi  is the no-tax-gain cost of equity. decomposing 
these cash flows as follows:
NTG
NTG
 X(1 ) - rD  X(1 )  rD , = S
ri
=  (10)
we can solve for NTGi  via the portfolio approach to get12
NTG
UGTN
D D( r) ( r) .
S V D
i = + = +  (11)
Using these results, shareholder cash flows in MM’s tax 
models can be decomposed as
MM’s tax correction model: NTG
NTG
 X(1 ) rD  rD  S  = S D,
ri
+ = +  (12)
MM’s tax original model: NTG
NTG
 X(1 ) rD  rD  rD S  = S .
i
+ = +  (13)
Because the equity component NTGS  is common in both 
cases, these equations clearly show that equity value is 
affected by the choice of discount rate for interest deduc-
tions. setting these equations equal to the more general 
equity expression in equation (4), the portfolio approach 
again yields the cost of equity equations (7) and (8) (see 
appendix for proof). 
Based on these results, MM’s tax correction model can be 
rewritten as: 
L NTG UV  S D  S D D V  D,= + = + + = +   (14)
where NTG US V=  at zero debt. this equation explicitly 
shows the well-known mm result that shareholders reap 
all tax gains on debt, i.e., NTGS   S  D= + . MM’s original 
tax model yields NTG
 rDS  = S .+  notably, when debt levels 
reach the point at which D > UV , the levered equity value 
with no-tax-gain NTGS  becomes negative in their valuation 
models. this negative equity value is confirmed by the neg-
ative cost of equity NTGi  in equation (11) when D > UV . 
For example, given X = 1, t = 0.30, and ρt = 0.10, such that 
 UV  = 1(1 – 0.30) / 0.10), and also given that D = 8 (i.e., D > UV ), 
MM’s tax correction model yields tD = 2.4, LV  = UV  + 
tD = 9.4, and St
 
= LV  – D = 1.4, such that NTGS  = S
t- tD = 
11 As noted in Section 4, Miller’s equilibrium corporate and personal 
tax conditions similarly imply that there is no debt tax gain, so that 
Proposition i holds.
12 This cost of equity formula is the same as MM’s no-tax cost of 
equity but on an after-tax basis.
UV  – D = –1 and NTGi  = 0.10 + (1–0.30)(0.10–0.04)8/–1 
= –0.236. in this respect, whenever D > UV , which occurs 
over a considerable debt range from UV  to the all debt 
value of firm at LmaxV = Dmax = UV  + tDmax, the value of 
NTGS  will be negative. of course, it is not possible for eq-
uity value to be negative, as it has a lower bound of zero 
due to limited liability of equity holders. also, the expected 
cost of equity has a lower bound equal to the riskless rate 
and, therefore, cannot be negative. 
a revised tax model approach
to avoid these problems, if interest deductions are dis-
counted at the cost of equity under the proposed revised 
tax model, NTGS  and i
t are not negative at any debt level. 
if this possibility is considered, shareholder cash flows can 
be decomposed as follows:
Revised tax model: 
 X(1 )  rD  rD S  =  .
r i
+  (15)
Using the portfolio approach to solve for the cost of equity 
(see appendix), we obtain13
U
D( r) .
V D
i = +  (16)
interestingly, the cost of equity with interest deductions it 
in equation (16) is the same as the cost of equity without 
interest deductions NTGi  in equation (11). Consequently, it 
can be written that: 
Revised tax model:
NTG
NTG
 X(1 ) rD  rD  X(1 ) rD  rD  rD ,+S = S    
i i i i i
+ = + =
 
(17)
where it = NTGi . the revised tax model posits the following 
valuation relationships:
13 an alternate cash flow proof of equation (16) is to assume that 
Ψ vts = ts, where Ψ = the discount rate on debt interest tax de-
ductions, vts = the present value of the debt tax shield, and ts = 
the interest tax deduction in each period. We can similarly define 
the cash flows available to shareholders (CFe), debtholders (CFd), 
and the unlevered firm (FCF) as it St = CFe, r d = CFd, and UV  
= 
FCF, respectively. Using these definitions, the cash flows of the firm 
can be written as FCF + ts = CFe + CFd or UV  
+ Ψ vts = i
t St 
+ r d. if we assume ψt = it, then we have UV  
+ it vts = it St
 
+ r 
d, which can be readily solved to get it in equation (16). Based on 
the adjusted Present value (aPv) approach, this result can easily 
be shown to hold for both perpetuities and finite cash flows. Un-
like MM’s cost of equity formulas, notice that levered equity value 
does not show up on the right-hand-side. since the cost of equity it 
depends on the value of equity st, and vice versa, in their formulas, 
there is circularity between it and s
t (see miles and ezzell (1980, 
p. 729)). By contrast, no such circularity exists in equation (16) for 
fixed d.
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rD rDV  S D  S D V  ,
i i
= + = + + = +  (18)
which differs from MM’s tax correction model in equation 
(14). since the cost of equity increases at an increasing 
rate as the firm increases financial leverage, interest tax 
deductions will be considerably less than MM’s tax model, 
especially at higher debt levels. the next section shows this 
effect by means of numerical examples. importantly, it is 
found that NTGS  and i
t are not negative at any debt level.
A natural question is: When debt exceeds unlevered value 
in MM’s tax models, which are derived under the assump-
tion of interest deductibility, are there any real economic 
consequences of negative equity without interest deduc-
tions? to answer this question, suppose that interest is de-
ductible from taxes but the government changes the tax 
rules to disallow such deductions. For firms with d > UV , 
the value of NTGS  is negative, which would cause equity 
value to immediately fall to zero. in effect, all of equity 
value is simply due to debt tax gains. none of the operating 
profits of the firm contribute to equity value, which does 
not make sense under the assumption of no bankruptcy 
risk. For instance, suppose that X = 1, t = 0.30, ρt ρt = 
0.10 (i.e., UV  = X (1 - t)/ρ
t = 1(1 - 0.30)/0.10 = 7), and r 
= 0.04. Under these assumptions, even at almost the max-
imum debt in MM’s tax correction model, after-tax cash 
flows without interest deductions are sufficient to cover 
interest payments, or X (1 - t) > rd as 1(1 - 0.30) = 0.70 
> 0.04(9.99) = 0.3996, where d = 9.99 at near the corner 
solution of all debt. since there is no bankruptcy risk even 
at high debt levels, and operating profits are always posi-
tive, equity value with no interest deductions (and related 
cost of equity) should not be negative in their tax correc-
tion model without interest deductions. 
numerical examples 
in this section numerical examples are used to demonstrate 
the differences between MM’s tax correction model and 
the proposed revised tax model. table 1 compares the val-
uation results of these two models assuming that:v X = 1, 
t = 0.30, ρ = 0.04, ρt = 0.10, and UV  = 7 (i.e., UV  = X(1–t)/ 
 ρ
t = 1(1–0.30)/0.10 = 7). Referring to MM’s tax correction 
table 1. numerical examples of corporate valuation comparing mm’s tax correction model to the revised tax model 
mm’s tax correction model
LV  = St
 
+ D = UV  
+ trD/r = UV + tD
revised tax model
 UV = St + D = UV + trD/ it
 UV  t
debt/
Value
ratio
debt/
equity
ratio
 LV D St i
t
tax 
gain
  tD
NTGS LV d St it 
tax 
gain
trD/ it 
NTGS
7 0.30 0 0.00  7.00 0.00 7.00 0.100 0.00 7.00 7.00 0.00 7.00 0.100 0.00 7.00
7 0.30 0.05 0.05  7.11 0.36 6.75 0.102 0.11 6.64 7.04 0.35 6.69 0.103 0.04 6.65
7 0.30 0.10 0.11  7.22 0.72 6.49 0.105 0.22 6.28 7.08 0.71 6.37 0.107 0.08 6.29
7 0.30 0.15 0.18  7.33 1.10 6.23 0.107 0.33 5.90 7.12 1.07 6.05 0.111 0.12 5.93
7 0.30 0.20 0.25  7.45 1.49 5.96 0.111 0.45 5.51 7.15 1.43 5.72 0.115 0.15 5.57
7 0.30 0.25 0.33  7.57 1.89 5.68 0.114 0.57 5.11 7.18 1.79 5.38 0.121 0.18 5.21
7 0.30 0.30 0.43  7.69 2.31 5.38 0.118 0.69 4.69 7.20 2.16 5.04 0.127 0.20 4.84
7 0.30 0.35 0.54  7.82 2.74 5.08 0.123 0.82 4.26 7.23 2.53 4.70 0.134 0.23 4.47
7 0.30 0.40 0.67  7.95 3.18 4.77 0.128 0.95 3.82 7.24 2.90 4.35 0.142 0.24 4.10
7 0.30 0.45 0.82  8.09 3.64 4.45 0.134 1.09 3.36 7.26 3.27 3.99 0.152 0.26 3.73
7 0.30 0.50 1.00  8.24 4.12 4.12 0.142 1.24 2.88 7.26 3.63 3.63 0.165 0.26 3.37
7 0.30 0.55 1.22  8.38 4.61 3.77 0.151 1.38 2.39 7.27 4.00 3.27 0.180 0.27 3.00
7 0.30 0.60 1.50  8.54 5.12 3.41 0.163 1.54 1.88 7.26 4.36 2.91 0.199 0.26 2.64
7 0.30 0.65 1.86  8.70 5.65 3.04 0.178 1.70 1.35 7.25 4.71 2.54 0.224 0.25 2.29
7 0.30 0.70 2.33  8.86 6.20 2.66 0.198 1.86 0.80 7.24 5.07 2.17 0.257 0.24 1.93
7 0.30 0.75 3.00  9.03 6.77 2.26 0.226 2.03 0.23 7.21 5.41 1.80 0.304 0.21 1.57
7 0.30 0.80 4.00  9.21 7.37 1.84 0.268 2.21 -0.37 7.18 5.75 1.44 0.375 0.18 1.25
7 0.30 0.85 5.67  9.40 7.99 1.41 0.338 2.40 -0.99 7.15 6.08 1.07 0.494 0.15 0.92
7 0.30 0.90 9.00  9.59 8.63 0.96 0.478 2.59 -1.63 7.10 6.39 0.71 0.733 0.10 0.61
7 0.30 0.95 19.00  9.79 9.30 0.49 0.898 2.79 -2.30 7.06 6.70 0.35 1.452 0.06 0.29
7 0.30  1.00 -- 10.00 10.00 0.00 -- 3.00  -3.00  7.00 7.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00
This table compares MM’s tax correction model to the revised tax model. The following assumptions are made: the corporate tax rate t equals 30 percent, there are no personal taxes, the unlevered value 
of the firm UV
 
equals 7, the cost of riskless debt r is 4 percent, and the unlevered equity rate ρt is 10 percent. debt-to-value ratios range from 0 to 1. other values are defined as follows: UV  = value of the 
levered firm with taxes, St = value of levered equity with taxes, NTGS = value of levered equity with taxes but no deductibility of interest payments, d = value of debt, i
t = levered cost of equity, trd = interest 
tax deduction, td = trd/r = present value of interest tax deductions discounted at the riskless debt rate, and trd/ it = present value of interest tax deductions discounted at levered cost of equity.
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model, it can be confirmed that NTGS  S  D= + ; for ex-
ample, at a debt/value ratio of 0.40, we have 4.77 ≅ 3.82 
+ 0.30(3.18).
 
In this regard, the last column under MM’s 
tax correction model results shows that, when d > UV , the 
value of equity with no interest deductions, or NTGS , be-
comes negative. By contrast, under the revised tax model, 
the value of debt does not exceed the unlevered value of 
the firm at any debt level, such that NTGS  is never negative. 
thus, discounting interest deductions at the cost of equity 
resolves the problem of negative equity without interest 
deductions found in MM’s tax models. 
Figure 1 plots data provided in table 1 to show that the 
levered cost of equity for the revised tax model14 (bold 
line) is somewhat higher than for MM’s tax correction 
model (lower thin line). this result can be explained by 
the general expression for the levered cost of equity, or
 (X rD)(1 ) = 
S
i
 
wherein the value of equity in the de-
nominator in the revised tax model is lower than in MM’s 
tax correction model due to the lower debt tax gain avail-
able to shareholders. 
a much larger disparity between these two models is ap-
parent in Figure 2’s valuation results. Note that, in con-
trast to MM’s tax correction model, the value of debt in 
the revised tax model never exceeds the unlevered value 
of the firm, even at relatively high debt levels. as the 
capital structure approaches all debt, the tax gain trD/it 
14 the levered cost of equity was computed using equation (11) and 
then checked against the general levered cost of equity formula, or 
.)/S-rD)(1 - X(= i
approaches zero, and debt approaches UV . also, the re-
vised tax model does not yield the all-debt corner solu-
tion of MM’s tax correction model; instead, a flat-based, 
inverse U-shaped firm value function (bold line) emerges 
with a maximum firm value of 7.27 at an interior optimal 
debt/value ratio of about 0.55. this maximum firm value 
exceeds the unlevered value of the firm equal to 7 by only 
0.27, which represents a debt tax shield of just 3.9 per-
cent of unlevered equity value, as shown in the last column 
in table 1 labeled trD/it.
 
By comparison, at a debt/value 
ratio of 0.55, MM’s tax correction model yields the much 
larger debt tax shield trd/r = td
 
of 1.38, or 19.7 percent 
of unlevered equity value. additionally, the debt tax shield 
in MM’s tax model continues to increase and even accel-
erate beyond this debt/value ratio. By comparison, the 
inverse U-shape of the firm value function in Figure 2 is 
relatively flat throughout the range of debt/value ratios. 
the flatness of the firm value function appears to support 
MM’s (1958) Proposition I to some degree. Figure 3 shows 
the value of equity with no–tax-gain, or NTGS , in MM’s 
tax correction model (bold line), which becomes negative 
when debt value exceeds the unlevered value of the firm, 
compared to its more compatible value in the revised tax 
model, which is always positive for any capital structure. 
if a higher debt rate is assumed, the size of the debt tax 
shield increases to some extent. For example, all else the 
same, if the debt rate is raised to 0.08 (i.e., closer to the 
unlevered equity rate of 0.10), the maximum value of the 
firm increases to 7.80 at an optimal debt/value ratio of 
about 0.60. this optimal capital structure is not much 
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FigUre 1. levered cost of equity: mm’s tax correction model (lower thin line) and the revised tax model (upper bold)
assumptions: unlevered equity rate = 0.10, riskless debt rate = 0.04, and corporate tax rate = 0.30. 
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FigUre 2. Values of debt, equity, and the firm: mm’s tax correction model (thin lines) and revised tax model (bold)
assumptions: unlevered value of the firm = 7, unlevered equity rate = 0.10, riskless debt rate = 0.04, and corporate tax rate = 0.30. 
FigUre 3. equity values with no debt tax gains: mm’s tax correction model (thin line) and revised tax model (bold)
assumptions: unlevered value of the firm = 7, unlevered equity rate = 0.10, riskless debt rate = 0.04, and corporate tax rate = 0.30. 
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different than the 0.55 optimal ratio at the 0.04 debt rate, 
which suggests that the optimum is relatively stable and 
would not change much in a dynamic setting. However, 
the debt tax shield jumps from 0.26 to 0.80, or from 3.9 
percent to 11.4 percent of unlevered equity value, as the 
debt rate increases from 0.04 to 0.08. Hence, all else the 
same, changes in debt rates can cause the magnitude of 
the debt tax shield to noticeably change. Figure 4 graphs 
the valuation results using the higher riskless debt rate 
of 0.08, which shows that the debt tax shield is consider-
ably higher than in Figure 1 (i.e., the firm value function in 
more inverse U-shaped). sensitivity of debt tax shields to 
interest rates contrasts sharply with MM’s tax correction 
model in which the present value of debt tax shields does 
not change as riskless debt rates increase. this result 
seems counter-intuitive, as higher riskless debt rates pro-
vide increasingly greater interest tax deductions that are 
available to shareholders, and vice versa. 
What if the unlevered (rather than levered) cost of equity 
is used to discount all expected after-tax earnings of the 
firm including interest tax deductions as in MM’s original 
tax model?15 Figure 5 repeats the above analyses under 
15 Kaplan and Ruback (1995) dubbed discounting all capital cash 
flows available to both debt and equity holders at the unlevered 
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this assumption.16 The thin line represents MM’s tax correc-
tion model. The bold lines graph MM’s original tax model 
discounting debt tax shields at the unlevered cost of eq-
uity using riskless debt rates of 0.04 and 0.08, all else the 
same. at the lower riskless debt rate of 0.04, the maximum 
debt tax shield is about 0.95 at near all debt, but it in-
creases considerably to about 2.21 at the higher debt rate 
of 0.08. Figure 5 shows that using the higher debt rate of 
0.08 yields large tax gains on interest deductions that ap-
proach MM’s tax correction model. Hence, as the spread 
between the unlevered cost of equity and riskless debt 
rate decreases (e.g., due to lower business risk for a firm or 
good economic times with lower general business risk that 
tend to lower the unlevered cost of equity), the difference 
in firm values between MM’s original tax and tax corrected 
tax models decreases. these results demonstrate that dis-
counting debt tax shields at the unlevered cost of equity: (1) 
still implies an all-debt capital structure, and (2) does not 
cost of equity the Compressed adjusted Present value technique 
(Compressed aPv). the intuition is that capital cash flows are 
comprised of all after-tax cash flows, including interest tax 
deductions. they noted that this approach is equivalent to the 
adjusted Present value (aPv) method of discounting interest tax 
deductions at the unlevered cost of equity. this approach assumes 
that interest tax deductions have the same systematic risk as the 
firm’s unlevered cash flows, which are associated with the business 
risk of the firm.
16 the complete numerical example is available from the authors 
upon request. 
necessarily diminish debt tax gains to small values relative 
to MM’s tax correction model under low business risk con-
ditions. moreover, using unlevered equity rates yields the 
same negative equity values as MM’s tax correction model. 
assuming that UV  = 7 and d = 8 as in section 2 (i.e., 
d > UV ), regardless of the riskless debt rates and unlevered 
equity rates used, we again obtain NTGS  = UV  - d = -1. 
The only difference from MM’s tax correction model is that 
the maximum value of debt is reduced due to the lower 
maximum firm value using the unlevered equity rate. 
nonetheless, at some point debt value can exceed unle-
vered equity value, which implies negative equity value 
with no-tax-gains. 
not surprisingly, the cost of capital under the revised tax 
model differs considerably from MM’s tax correction model 
but is similar to their original tax model. the weighted av-
erage cost of capital for a levered firm can be generally17 
defined as:
WACC = it(St LV ) + r(1–t)(DL/ LV ),  (19)
where r(1– t) = the after-tax cost of debt. substituting the 
levered cost of equity in equation (16) into equation (19), 
the WACC can be written as:
17 this formula is popular in finance textbooks. its assumptions are 
not always met (e.g., operating earnings are greater than financial 
expenses, and taxes are paid the same year of accrual).
FigUre 4. Values of debt, equity, and the firm: mm’s tax correction model (thin lines) and revised tax model (bold lines)
assumptions: unlevered value of the firm = 7, unlevered equity rate = 0.10, riskless debt rate = 0.08, and corporate tax rate = 0.30. 
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WACC = [ 1– r 
i
(DL/ LV )]. (20)
if the levered equity rate it is replaced with the riskless 
debt rate r, MM’s tax correction model’s cost of capital, 
or WACC = (1–t DL/ LV ), is obtained. equation (20) im-
plies that, as the riskless debt rate increases, the cost of 
capital function becomes more U-shaped (and related firm 
value function more inverse U- shaped), all else the same. 
Figure 6 plots the cost of capital for the revised tax model 
in equation (20) versus MM’s tax correction model using 
data from Table 1’s numerical examples. The cost of cap-
ital for MM’s tax correction model falls continuously until 
it reaches a relatively low minimum at all debt, where firm 
value is maximized. However, the minimum cost of capital 
for the revised tax model is slightly U-shaped with a min-
imum value of about 0.096 at an optimal debt/value ratio 
of about 0.55, where firm value is maximized at 7.27. the 
relatively flat shape of the cost of capital function is again 
somewhat consistent with MM’s Proposition I. The fact 
that the cost of capital does not decrease substantially as 
more low cost debt is employed by the firm is attributable 
to discounting interest tax deductions at the levered cost 
of equity, which is evident in equation (20). increased debt 
results in higher interest tax deductions but a higher le-
vered cost of equity also. 
personal taxes and miller
Miller’s (1977) renowned work on capital structure, firm 
valuation, and personal taxes proposed dramatically lower 
debt tax shields compared to MM’s tax correction model.18 
this section extends the revised tax model to the miller 
valuation model incorporating both corporate and per-
sonal taxes. tax terms are defined as follows: tps = the per-
sonal tax rate on equity earnings, tpb = the personal tax 
rate on debt earnings, and q = [1– (1–t)(1–tps)/(1–tpb)]. 
according to miller, due to equilibrium tax conditions in 
the bond markets, the value of the firm with corporate and 
personal taxes is D. + V = V UL  Particularly relevant to 
the present paper, cash flows to shareholders are exposed 
to personal equity tax rates as follows:
(X rD)(1- )(1 ps) X(1 )(1 ps) rD(1 ps) rD(1 ps),+=
where the last term clearly shows that the interest tax de-
ductions are shareholders’ cash flow due to its association 
with the personal equity tax rate (per Ross’ observation 
cited earlier).
18 see also Benninga and sarig (1997) and Benninga (2006) for 
further discussion of personal taxes and debt tax shields.
FigUre 5. Firm values: mm’s tax correction model discounting debt tax shields at the riskless debt rate (thin line) compared 
to mm’s original tax model discounting debt tax shields at the unlevered equity rate with alternative riskless debt rates of r = 
0.04 and r = 0.08 (bold lines)
assumptions: unlevered value of the firm = 7, unlevered equity rate = 0.10, and corporate tax rate = 0.30. 
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Given that ρp is the unlevered cost of equity after both cor-
porate and personal equity taxes, the levered cost of eq-
uity in the revised tax model becomes
U
D( r )
V D
i = + , (21)
where the debt rate is after personal taxes on debt in-
terest, and after-tax values are denoted by superscript p. 
the value of the firm becomes
UL
 X  X(1 )(1 ps) rD r DV  =   V .
i i
= + = +  (22)
With no personal taxes, equations (21) and (22) collapse 
to their corporate tax only counterparts in equations (16) 
and (18), respectively. 
Under Miller’s equilibrium corporate and personal tax con-
ditions wherein q = 0, the debt tax shield is zero and equa-
tion (22) collapses to the no-tax-gain relation NTGV  = NTGS  
+ D = UV , such that Proposition i holds as proposed earlier 
in section 2. However, if q ≠ 0 for an individual firm, then 
leverage changes the value of the firm. since it is likely for 
individual firms that q < t, previous results for the revised 
tax model under low tax rates are most applicable. thus, 
conditional on the assumption that the spread between 
the unlevered cost of equity and debt rate is not relatively 
low, Proposition i generally holds for low levels of q for an 
individual firm but may be rejected as q increases. also, 
even if q = t due to national tax policies (e.g., for t = tps = 
tpb or other tax regimes), Proposition i can approximately 
hold under conditions discussed in the previous section. 
Hence, while Miller’s introduction of personal taxes sub-
stantially affects MM’s tax model valuation results, per-
sonal taxes do not change the form of the revised tax 
model and have much less effect on the valuation results. 
For the most part, the revised tax model is robust to the 
introduction of personal taxes, which lends further support 
for its predictions. 
implications of the revised tax model 
the revised tax model has a number of important implica-
tions to corporate capital structure decisions and related 
literature that tend to affirm its feasibility as a plausible 
valuation theory. First, the revised model implies much 
smaller debt tax shields than MM’s original and tax correc-
tion models. in the comparative examples in table 1, given 
an unlevered equity value of 7, the maximum debt tax 
shield is 0.27 compared to the maximum of 3 for MM’s tax 
correction model at all debt. in the context of the trade-
off theory balancing expected tax gains on interest deduc-
tions against expected bankruptcy costs, the revised tax 
model implies a “fox and rabbit stew,” in contrast to mill-
er’s (1977) observation that MM’s tax correction model en-
visages a “horse and rabbit stew.” Consistent with modest 
debt tax gains, a number of U.s. and international empirical 
studies (e.g., MacKie-Mason (1990), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt (2001), Huizinga, 
laeven, nicodeme (2008), and others) have confirmed 
Figure 6. cost of capital: mm’s tax correction model (thin line) and the revised tax model (bold line)
assumptions: unlevered value of the firm = 7, unlevered equity rate = 0.10, riskless debt rate = 0.04, and corporate tax rate = 0.30.
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that the relationship between firm leverage and taxa-
tion is relatively weak. also, a number of studies have 
found that debt tax benefits have a smaller effect on firm 
value than MM’s tax correction would predict (e.g., Fama 
and French (1998), Graham (2000, 2008), Kemsley and 
nissim (2002), and others). For example, Graham (2000) 
found that the tax benefit of debt is about 9-10 percent of 
firm value in the period 1980-1994. Kemsley and Nissim 
(2002) estimated the value of the net debt tax shield for 
U.s. firms in the period 1963-1993 to be about 10 per-
cent of firm value. another study by Graham (2008) pro-
vided a range of debt tax benefits relative to firm value 
from 7.7 percent to 9.8 percent in the period 1995-1999. 
Recently, van Binsbergen, Graham, and yang (2010) ap-
praised the net benefit of debt to be about 3.5 percent of 
firm value (i.e., a 10.4 percent gross benefit and 6.9 per-
cent costs), and Korteweg (2010) assessed the net ben-
efits of debt to be about 5.5 percent of firm value. Using 
data from table 1 (see Figure 1) with the debt rate set 
at 0.04, MM’s maximum debt tax shield at near all debt 
approaches 30 percent of firm value, whereas we get a 
maximum of only 3.7 percent at a debt/value ratio of 
0.55. However, upon increasing the debt rate from 0.04 
to 0.08 (see Figure 2), the maximum tax shield for the re-
vised tax model is slightly more than 10 percent of firm 
value at a debt ratio of 0.60. Using this higher debt rate, 
Figure 7 compares the present values of debt tax shields 
(in percent of firm value terms) for MM’s tax correction 
model and our revised tax model. our results for debt 
rates in the range of 0.04 to 0.08 are remarkably consis-
tent with empirical evidence. 
in this regard, no bankruptcy are assumed costs in deriving 
our debt tax shield. However, bankruptcy and other bal-
ancing costs are impounded in debt and equity rates, as 
debtholders and equityholders adjust their expected rates 
of return to reflect such costs. Consequently, balancing 
costs should not change the form of the revised tax mod-
el’s valuation results. Equation (16) shows that the cost 
of equity would be affected by balancing costs via their 
impact on the debt rate. Bankruptcy risk would increase 
the debt rate, as bondholders demand a risk premium to 
compensate for potential future losses of interest and prin-
cipal. as the debt rate increases and becomes closer to 
the unlevered equity rate, potential debt tax shields tend 
to increase (as discussed previously with respect to Figure 
4). other variables in the equation, including the unle-
vered equity rate, debt, and equity, would be based on 
market values. Using the cost of equity to discount firms’ 
interest tax deductions provides a simple way to capture 
how investors exposed to bankruptcy and other risks value 
debt tax shields. empirical tests can readily implement this 
approach to quantify net tax shields on debt interest de-
ductions and observe the tax shield function throughout 
the range of observed leverage. 
second, the results in table 1 indicate that there is a fairly 
wide range of debt/value ratios within which most of the 
present value of debt tax shields is captured. For example, 
when 0.30 < (DL/ LV < 0.80, the debt tax gains available 
to shareholders reach levels in the range of 0.18 to 0.27 
assuming r = 0.04 and in the range of 0.49 to 0.80 as-
suming r = 0.08. it appears that differences in the levels 
of debt tax shields within this debt/value range are rela-
tively small, especially for lower riskless debt rates relative 
to unlevered equity rates. it is inferred that the revised tax 
model implies a “relevant range” for capital structure in 
the sense that most tax gains available to shareholders are 
achieved. this implication agrees with empirical evidence 
and actual practice. In this regard, Kane, Marcus, and Mc-
donald (1984) have reported that the actual range of debt-
to-value ratios for U.s. firms is from zero to 60 percent. 
more recently, Frank and Goyal (2008) have documented 
that the average debt-to-value ratios of the aggregate U.s. 
nonfarm, nonfinancial business sector ranged from 0.27 
to 0.45 in the period 1945 to early 2000s. Related to this 
discussion, the revised tax model implies that even mod-
erate debt-to-value ratios are able to capture the lion’s 
share of shareholder tax gains. Hence, it is possible that 
debt-to-value ratios could vary considerably among similar 
firms that obtain most tax gains available to shareholders 
– an implication that helps to mitigate a previously unad-
dressed problem in the static trade-off theory of capital 
structure observed by myers (1984).
third, the revised tax model implies that even firms with 
low probabilities of financial distress and, in turn, low ex-
pected bankruptcy costs may employ fairly conservative 
debt-to-value ratios. this implication helps to reconcile 
another problem inherent in the trade-off theory raised 
by myers (2001). that is, many highly profitable and big 
firms with investment grade credit ratings use conserva-
tive levels of debt even though the trade-off theory pre-
dicts that such firms should use higher levels of interest tax 
shields (e.g., Graham (2000, 2008), Kemsley and Nissim 
(2002), and others).19 in view of the revised tax model, 
19 Problems with the trade-off theory in part motivated myers (1984) 
to propose the pecking order theory of capital structure (see also 
myers and majluf (1984)). this theory predicts that firms do not 
have target or optimal capital structures. instead, driven by ad-
verse selection costs derived from asymmetric information between 
managers and the financial market as well as debt capacity, firms 
initially utilize internally generated funds, then debt, and lastly eq-
uity in a pecking order. another theory of capital structure with no 
target leverage ratio focuses on market timing. Baker and Wurgler 
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even firms with no expected bankruptcy costs would not 
likely use high levels of interest tax shields. most tax gain 
advantages of debt are exhausted in the lower half of the 
relevant debt/value range.
Fourth, the revised tax model implies an inverse U-shaped 
firm value function. the hallmark of the trade-off theory 
balancing debt tax gains against expected bankruptcy and 
other potential debt-related costs is an inverse U-shaped 
firm valuation function. However, the revised tax model 
yields this intuitively attractive and popular firm valuation 
function without these balancing costs. it is the nonlin-
early increasing levered cost of equity as debt increases 
that serves as a countervailing force to offset rising in-
terest deductions and produce the inverse U-shaped firm 
value function. additionally, introducing bankruptcy costs 
in a trade-off valuation setting can be readily implemented 
by appropriately adjusting the levered cost of equity.
Fifth, returning to the impact of changes in riskless debt 
rates discussed in the previous section, as riskless debt 
rates increase relative to a fixed unlevered cost of equity, 
Figure 4 shows that debt tax shields increase and optimal 
debt/value ratios are somewhat higher than for lower risk-
less debt rates in Figure 2, all else the same. in the limit 
at a zero interest rate, there is no debt tax shield, and the 
value of the firm is independent of financial leverage in 
line with Proposition I of MM’s original no tax model. It 
can be inferred that, as riskless debt rates fall to very low 
levels that approach zero, trivial debt tax shields imply that 
Proposition i holds for the most part. on the other hand, 
(2002) find that firms time equity issues to take advantage of high 
market values, which affect firms’ short- and long-run capital struc-
tures.
as riskless debt rates increase narrowing the difference 
from the unlevered cost of equity, the debt tax shield func-
tion becomes more inverse U-shaped indicative of signifi-
cant potential debt tax shields and, therefore, rejection of 
Proposition i. Hence, the revised tax model may or may 
not reject Proposition i depending on the level of riskless 
debt rates (relative to the unlevered cost of equity) that 
affects the shape of the firm value function. starkly con-
trasting with these riskless debt rate implications, in MM’s 
tax correction model very low interest rates have no effect 
on debt tax shields (i.e., equal to td for all positive riskless 
debt rates even if the magnitude of interest deductions 
is trivial). the same problem affects discounting debt tax 
shields with the unlevered equity rate in the case of firms 
with low business risk that have unlevered equity rates 
close to the riskless rate. 
sixth, assuming a fixed riskless debt rate, the revised tax 
model results in Figures 2 and 4 imply that firms with 
higher business risk have lower debt tax shields and op-
timal debt/value ratios, all else the same. Higher business 
risk increases the unlevered cost of equity and, there-
fore, widens its spread over the fixed riskless debt rate. 
Conversely, firms with lower business risk have narrower 
spreads between the unlevered cost of equity and risk-
less debt rate, which makes the firm value function more 
inverse U-shaped. Following this logic, in good economic 
times with lower general business risk, the present value 
of the debt tax shield would be more inverse U-shaped 
across firms, and vice versa in bad economic times (i.e., 
unlevered equity rates increase in recessions and riskless 
debt rates tend to decrease due to stimulative monetary 
policy efforts by central banks, which would increase their 
spread and tend to flatten the firm value function). it can 
be inferred that Proposition i is more likely to hold for high 
FigUre 7. present value of debt tax shields in percent of firm value terms: mm’s tax correction model (thin line) and the 
revised mm tax model (bold line)
assumptions: unlevered value of the firm = 7, unlevered equity rate = 0.10, riskless debt rate = 0.08, and corporate tax rate = 0.30.
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than low business risk firms and for bad as opposed to 
good economic times. also, differences between high and 
low business risk firms decrease as riskless debt rates de-
crease and are virtually eliminated as riskless debt rates 
and therefore debt tax shields approach zero as observed 
above. it is possible that differences in business risk help 
to explain the fact that leverage ratios of low and high 
debt firms are highly persistent over time and not related 
for the most part to size, profitability, market-to-book, in-
dustry, and other previously identified determinants of 
capital structure (see Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), mackay and Phillips (2005), lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender (2008), and citations therein). 
seventh, the debt tax shield function is affected by the cor-
porate tax rate. as corporate tax rates increase, the debt 
tax shield available to shareholders increases, all else the 
same (i.e., (trD/it)/t > 0). this tax effect on corporate cap-
ital structure is consistent with empirical work by MacKie-
mason (1990), trezevant (1992), Graham (1996), and 
Graham, lemmon, and schallheim (1998), who have found 
that high-tax-rate firms use more debt than low-tax-rate 
firms. Also, other papers by Gordon and MacKie-Mason 
(1990), Givoly, Hahn, ofer, and sarig (1992), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Booth, aivazian, demirgüç, maksimovic 
(2001), and Huizinga, laeven, and nicodeme (2008) have 
found that changes in corporate (and personal) tax rates 
lead to predicted changes in debt ratios among firms. 
eighth, the revised tax model with personal taxes implies 
that Proposition i is more likely to hold, which may help 
to explain the weak effect of national tax regimes on firm 
leverage found in international empirical studies by Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), Booth, aivazian, demirgúç, maksi-
movic (2001), Huizinga, laeven, and nicodeme (2008), 
and others. 
ninth, and last, a general implication based on the above 
discussion is that Proposition i can approximately hold 
under a variety of conditions, including relatively low 
riskless debt rates, high unlevered costs of equity (i.e., 
business risk), and low corporate tax rates, as well as com-
binations of these conditions. an inverse U-shaped firm 
value function exists but its shape is relatively flat under 
these conditions. this general implication is consistent 
with Modigliani’s (1988) later reversal of the 1963 MM tax 
correction model in favor of Proposition i in the original 
1958 mm paper. Under other conditions, Proposition i may 
not hold. Perhaps the most obvious assumption to relax 
is riskless debt. most firms issue debt at an interest rate 
in excess of comparable maturity government debt (e.g., 
U.s. treasury rates). these higher debt costs would tend to 
boost interest tax deductions as well as narrow the spread 
from unlevered equity rates and, therefore, work against 
Proposition i.
together, the aforementioned implications lend support 
for the revised tax model by helping to reconcile theory 
and evidence on capital structure and firm valuation. of 
course, future empirical tests are recommended to directly 
investigate the tax shield function hypothesized by our re-
vised tax model.
conclusion
mm corrected their 1958 debt irrelevance proposition in 
1963 to derive an all debt corner solution to capital struc-
ture. in efforts to soften this extreme outcome, researchers 
have introduced bankruptcy and other potential debt 
costs as balancing factors, relaxed the no personal taxes 
assumption, and discounted interest tax deductions using 
different debt and unlevered equity rates. 
Given that their tax models imply that after-tax equity 
value equals the sum of the after-tax equity value with 
no interest deductions (denoted NTGS ) plus the tax gain 
on interest deductions, it is found that equity value NTGS  
becomes negative (as well as the associated cost of equity 
NTGi ) when debt levels exceed the unlevered value of the 
firm. of course, negative equity values and equity rates are 
not possible. 
an alternative discounting approach for debt tax shields 
was proposed that resolves these issues. Portfolio analyses 
showed that that the cost of equity with and without in-
terest deductions is the same and does not become nega-
tive at any debt level. also, it was found that the equity 
value component NTGS  is never negative. these findings 
suggest that, because interest deductions are paid out 
to shareholders, they should be discounted at the cost of 
equity. shareholders discount all of their cash flow com-
ponents, whether from riskless or risky sources, at the ap-
propriate cost of equity. in this regard, shareholders value 
their cash flows by decomposing them into unlevered eq-
uity cash flows discounted at the unlevered equity rate plus 
levered cash flows (viz., interest deductions) discounted at 
the levered equity rate. 
the main findings of the proposed revised tax model are 
plausibly consistent with empirical evidence: (1) much 
smaller debt tax shields than in MM’s original and tax cor-
rection models; (2) a flat-based, inverse U-shaped firm 
value function with an interior optimal capital structure 
as opposed to an all-debt corner solution; (3) a relevant 
range of debt/value ratios spanning a fairly broad interval 
within which most debt tax shields are captured; (4) a flat-
based U-shaped cost of capital function; and (5) debt tax 
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shields and optimal capital structures that are sensitive 
to riskless debt rates, unlevered costs of equity (i.e., busi-
ness risk), and corporate tax rates. these results appear to 
be more akin to real world capital structure. interestingly, 
under some discount rate conditions, the firm value func-
tion is almost flat as leverage increases, which supports 
to some extent MM’s original 1958 Proposition I that firm 
valuation is independent of capital structure. However, as 
these variables interact to produce higher debt tax shields 
that are economically meaningful to shareholders, Proposi-
tion i was rejected. 
the revised tax model helps to explain the relatively weak 
relationship between financial leverage and national tax 
policies reported by numerous empirical studies. also, it 
addresses some previous criticisms of the trade-off theory 
of capital structure by miller (1977), myers (1984, 2001), 
and others rooted in large tax gains under MM’s tax cor-
rection model relative to expected bankruptcy costs. With 
respect to these criticisms, comparative static analyses of 
shareholder tax gains suggested that: (1) Miller’s criticism 
of MM’s tax correction model as a “horse and rabbit stew” 
can be less severely described as a “fox and rabbit stew;” 
(2) it is possible that similar firms could have widely di-
vergent leverage ratios; and, (3) large and profitable firms 
with low probabilities of financial distress may reasonably 
utilize fairly conservative debt-to-value ratios. Graham 
(2003, 2008) has cited the latter “underlevered or conser-
vative leverage puzzle” as an unresolved issue in capital 
structure. in this regard, the debt tax shield results of this 
paper do not support aggressive use of leverage even for 
large, profitable firms with low business risk (even though 
they have greater potential debt tax shields than high busi-
ness risk firms) and, therefore, help to explain more mod-
erate approaches to corporate debt financing observed in 
the real world. Based on these findings and implications, 
relevant to Green and Hollifield’s (2003) criticism of the 
mm tax correction model noted earlier in section 1, it is 
concluded that MM’s tax model in our proposed revised 
form should play a greater role in corporate capital struc-
ture pedagogy and policy than previously believed. 
Reflecting on his approach to introducing imperfect infor-
mation in economic models of competition, stiglitz (2001, 
p. 519) observed that, “it is not easy to change views of 
the world, and it seemed to me the most effective way 
of attacking the paradigm was to keep within the stan-
dard framework as much as possible.” likewise, the present 
paper has sought to stay within MM’s comparative-static 
valuation paradigm, rather than using option-based, dy-
namic, or other valuation approaches.
since the revised tax model predicts that the present value 
of debt tax shields is not large, other factors potentially 
affecting firm value, including bankruptcy costs, agency 
costs, asymmetric information, non-debt tax shields, 
market timing, corporate control, debt heterogeneity, bank 
credit, etc., are relatively important to capital structure de-
cisions by firms (e.g., for citations and discussion of this 
extensive literature, see Graham (2003, 2008), and Ho-
vakimian, Hovakimian, and tehranian (2004)). How these 
other factors precisely affect the inverse U-shaped debt 
tax shield function and the dynamic effects of changing 
corporate and personal tax rates, debt rates, and unle-
vered equity rates (business risk), in addition to changing 
debt levels, expected bankruptcy costs, and other factors, 
on the debt tax shield function are left for future study. 
While revised tax model analyses clearly suggest that op-
timal capital structures will be little affected by such dy-
namics, the magnitude of the debt tax shield may well be 
affected. Finally, from a policy perspective, if excessive fi-
nancial leverage in the 1990s and 2000s, especially in the 
home and commercial mortgage markets, was motivated 
in part by the desire of market participants to capture large 
debt tax gains, the revised tax model suggests that such 
efforts were misguided.
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this appendix applies a portfolio approach to equity dis-
count rates and their component cash flows. three alter-
native cases are considered using the riskless debt rate 
r, unlevered equity rate ρt, and cost of equity it to dis-
count interest deductions available to shareholders. share-
holders cash flows are defined as CFE = (X – rD)(1 – t)
which is comprised of free cash flow FCF = X(1–t) interest 
tax shields TS = trD, and cash flow to debtholders CFD = 
rD, i.e., CFE = FCF + TS – CFD. lastly, we also consider 
the case in which no interest deductions are allowed, such 
that shareholders’ cash flow is CFBI = FCF – CFD plus 
interest deductions TS. 
First, assuming ts is discounted using the riskless debt rate 
r as in MM’s tax correction model, the cost of equity it can 
be solved as follows. From a portfolio perspective, the cost 
of equity is a weighted average of the discount rates asso-
ciated with component cash flows, or
where VTS = the present value of interest deductions dis-
counted at r, and UV  + VTS – D = the value of equity. Re-
arranging this equation, 
( )( )D VTS
S
r
i+ =
.
since VTS = tD in the case of discounting interest deduc-
tions at the riskless rate r, we get it = ρt + (1 – t)(ρt – r)D/
St, which is the same as MM’s tax correction formula.
appendix 
decomposing the cash flows available to shareholders: a portfolio approach
second, assuming ts is discounted using the unlevered eq-
uity rate as in MM’s original tax model, the portfolio ap-
proach implies the following decomposition: 
Following the same steps as before, we obtain it = ρt + (ρt– r)
D/ St, which agrees with MM’s formula.
third, assuming that ts is discounted using the cost of eq-
uity under the proposed revised tax model, the following 
decomposition of cash flows is obtained:
which can be solved to obtain it = ρt +(ρt – r)D/(
UV  – D) 
as in equation (16) i n the text.
Fourth, and last, shareholders’ cash flow components can 
be redefined as comprised of cash flows before interest 
deductions, denoted CFBi = FCF – CFd, plus interest de-
ductions ts. Using r to discount interest deductions under 
MM’s tax correction model, the portfolio approach sug-
gests that:
where UV  – D in the denominator of the right-hand-side 
equals NTGS , or the no-tax-gain value of equity. after 
substituting
NTG
U
D( r)
V D
i = +  
from equation (11) in the denominator and rearranging 
terms, we again obtain MM’s result it = ρt +(1 – t)(ρt – r)
D/St. this same procedure can be repeated by discounting 
interest deductions using the unlevered equity rate or the 
cost of equity to yield MM’s original tax model or revised 
tax model formulas defined above, respectively.

